ILIW NE of the most widely accepted tenets of monetary theory is that persistent inflation is a monetary phenomenon. A deeper understanding of persistent inflation, therefore, must uncover the reasons for persistent increases in the money stock. This leads naturally to an investigation of the motives and constraints lacing central bankers who decide the course of monetary policy.
ILIW NE of the most widely accepted tenets of monetary theory is that persistent inflation is a monetary phenomenon. A deeper understanding of persistent inflation, therefore, must uncover the reasons for persistent increases in the money stock. This leads naturally to an investigation of the motives and constraints lacing central bankers who decide the course of monetary policy.
Recent theoretical literature on the behavior of monetary policymakers may be divided into two broad categones -positive and normative. The positive literature formulates hypotheses about the objectives and constraints fircing central bankers and derives implications for the behavior of both observable vanables (e.g., the rate of monetary growth amid the rate of inflation) and unobservable variables (e.g., policy credihilityi The normative literature focuses on the issue ofhow, given the behavior of central bankex-s, monetary institutions can he redesigned to improve social welfare. Both approaches use the same general analytic framework to model central bank behavior. This paper-, the first in a two-part survey, focuses on the positive aspects of central bank behavior-, with particular emphasis on the character zation and the determinants of policy credibility. Positive (and normative) theories of central bank behavior rely heavily on the notion that unanticipated money growth has temporary, positive effects on output and employment as a result either-of the Lucas (1973) effect' or the existence of long-term contr-acts in conjunction with cx post determination of employmerit by labor demand.2 They also rely on the view that central bankers have a well-defined objective function (preferences) for-econormuc stimulation arid inflation within each period as well as intertemporal preferences over combinations of those variables in the present and in the future.
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The notion of policy credibility is a fundamental one because the ability of monetary policymakers to achieve their future objectives depends on the inflationary expectations of the public. These inflationaiy expectations depend, in turn, on the public's evaluation of the credibility of the monetary poiicyrnakers. F'or example, Fellner (1976) and Haberler (1980) , who coined the ter-m ''Credibility Hypothesis,' have stressed that the less credible disintlationary policies are, the longer and the more severe theirinter-im adverse economic effects will be.
The theor-etical literature defines credibility as the extent to which the public believes that a sluft in policy has taken place when, indeed, such a shift has actually occur-red.
3 More important, to be credible, a policy must be consistent, at each stage, with the public's infor-mation about the objectives and constraints facing the central bank. The public will riot believe an announced policy if it knows the policy is incompatible with the current objectives of pohcvmaker-s.
Part of the theoretical literatur-e interprets the central bank's objective function as a social welfare function. In this approach, the policvniaker is east as a benevolent planner' whose sole concer'n is to maximize a well-defined social welfar-e function. Another part of the literature interpr-ets the objective function of the policynmaker iii terms of political objectives. In this approach the impor-tance assigned to pr-eventing inflation relative to stimulating the economy depends on the relative influence on the central bank of the pro-stimulation and anti-inflation advocates within government and the private sector-. Fornal models based on the social welfare and political approaches are similar' at tirries; however', intei-pt-etations of their results ar-c quite different depending on which approach is used. Therefor-e, the two approaches are discussed separately. 
~usns HAS
The social welfare approach is based on three key relationships. First, the economy is one in which deviations of eniplovmnent from its nat ui-al level ar-c positively related to unanticipated inflation; this can result from either the existence of a Lucas (1973) -type short-r-un Phillips curve or-a Fischer 19771-Taylor (1980) contract framework. Second, the monetary authority has a social welfare function that gives a negative w-eight to itiflation and a positive weight to employment even beyond the natural r'ate.' 11 chooses the rate of money growth arid, hence, inflation, overwhich it has per-fect control, that maximizes the social ivelfar-e flinctionl Finally, the public understands the cent -al bank's behavior' and forms its inflationLu~' expectations accordingly. Since inflation is ''bad,'' the best rare of monetary expansion must be zero. 'l'herefore, social welfare is maximized when both the actual and expected inflation are zer-o and employment is at its natural level.
Yet, the relatively simple model just described is sufficient to generate an inflationary bias; as a result, social welfare is lower than it would have been had the monetary authority been credibly committed to a zer-o money growth (zero inflation) rule.' In essence, the monetary authorities and the public are caught up in a kind of "prisoners' dilemma."
The dilemma is illustrated simply in the following model! The monetary author-ity and the public can be viewed as engaged in a game to determine what the level of output and the rate of inflation will be.. '[he economy s output is determined by a Lucas-Sargent aggregate supply funiction as shown in equation I it) table 1, where v is the actual level of output, ¾is its 'Shod-run discrepancies between the rate of inflation and the rate of monetary growth are abstracted from, in this discussion, by assuming that those two rates are equal at all times.
'This scenario originated in a well-known example by Kydland and Prescoff (1977) and was elaborated and formulated within an explicitly dynamic framework by Barro and Gordon (1983b) . 'This model is based on a static reformulation by Backus and Driffill (1 985a) . Table 1 The Monetary Policy GameBasic Model 'Under this definition, a new policy is credible if it is promptly believed, whether or not the new policy is more or less inflationary than the old one. This point is made in a related survey by McCallum (1984) . 4 The natural rate is the level of employment that would be obtained in the absence of monetary disturbances. Employment or output beyond this level contributes to social welfare if distortionary taxes or other constraints hold employment below its optimal level, An elaboration appears at the end of this section. Table 2 Payoff Tables for Basic Monetary Policy Game L Policymaker's Payoff Table (from equation 3) Public expects (m')
natural level, Luid rn and in' are the actual and expected inflation rates, n-es pectively! '11w po Iicyruaker's objective function (taken to be identical to the social welfare funct ionl is shown in equation 2 (table I) .'
When eqtration 1 is substituted into 2, the policynraker"s objective fur tction now takes the for-ru shown in equation 3 in table 1. 'l'aking ru' as given, the value of mr that maximizes social welfare is mu = I, resul tirig in a positive inflation rate. -I'his outconw can easily he seen in Ihe monetary policvmaker's payoff matrix shown in table 2 III. If the monetary aut I iontv chooses zero inflation, m = 0, its payoff is either' 0 or-'-2, depending on whether-re' equals t) or-I . If it chooses in = however-, its payoff is either' I or' -1 , dependi rig on whet her' rn' edlrrals 0 or I . tnfla tion is clearly the dominant stra te(çv fi-om the point of view of the run) netarv authority; the payoffs for mu = I are higher' re~rm-dless ofr+/iat inflation rate the pub/ic e,vpecls.
So fat-the analysis has focused solely on the monetary policymaker's objective function. However, the public also has an objective function; it is assumed to resist being fooled by policymaken's. The public is assumed to maximize a utility function similar to equation 4 in table 1, taking m as given. Because the public knows the monetary author-i~y's incentive 'Since output and employment are positively related, y can also be viewed as a proxy for employment.
'The various constants in equations I and 2 have been chosen for simplicity of exposition. The main qualitative point does not depend on the values of those constants, structure, it expects the monetary authority to choose m = 1; consequently, it chooses ni' = 1. 1~~~t~h e resultant outcome is an inferior solution, with payoffs of -1 to the monetary authority and 0 to the public.
The inflationary bias occurs because the monetary authority has the incentive to inflate in oider to increase employment once the public's inflationary expectations have been set. This incentive is present regardless of whethen-the public expects a zero or-a positive rate of inflation. Because the public recognizes this incentive, it r-ationally expects a positive rate of inflation; this forces the monetary authon-ity actually to inflate in order to maintain employment at its natural level. As a result, the economy ends up with the same employment level as trnder a zero money growth rule, but with excessive inflation arid lower welfare.
Barro and Gordon (198Th) characterize this solution as "discretionary" because the monetary authority can choose whatever rate of monetary gr-owth (and, hence, inflation) it desires. If the monetary authonity had been credibly committed to zero money growth (by a constitutional amendment, for exam pie), the superior solution, m = re' = 0, could have been achieved. But, in the absence of credible commitmerits on the par-t of the policyninaker-, the (Nashl equilibrium to the policy game involves positive and suhoptimal inflation.'' As pointed out by Harm and Gordon (1983b), the pr-isoner's'-diemma aspect of the policy game carries over to the case in which the policyrnaker cares about social welfare in both the present and future periods. Tlus can he illustrated by generalizing the objective function of the polhwmakec' as shown iii equation 5;
3is the discount factor applied to future welfat-e in the policymnaker's social welfare function. 'l'he term in brackets is the level of social welfar-e attained in the i'' period." 'the constant, A, is the turn-gmat n-ate of substitution between economic, stimulation and inflation prevention; the larger-A is, the more the policy-"This is obtained by differentiating equation 4 with respect to m°, equating to zero and solving for m'. "A Nash equilibrium is defined as a situation in which each of two sides chooses his best strategy, taking as given the optimal response of the other side, maker cares about employment n'eiative to inflation prevention at the margin.
As before, the policyniaken-chooses m~to maximize the social welfare function in equation 5, taking m~as given. Since there is nothing that links the periods, maximization of equation 5 is equivatent to maxintization of welfan-e within each pen-iod sepan-ately. More formally, the policynnaken' maximizes equation 6 for all i;
As shown in the mone.tary policymaker's pay-oil matrix icr table 3, the best choice is nil, A ml all periods."
As before, the public resists being fooled. Because it unden'stands the stn-ucture of incentives facing the p0 1 -icymaker, it nationally sets ru~= A in all periods. Again, the econon-ny ends up with a positive n-ate of inflation.
As before, the discretionary solution is not optimal; zero nnioniey growth yields a value of zero to the policymaker' (if the public expects morley growth to be zero), while the discretionary result yields a social welfare of
It is tempting to ar-guc that a sophisticated policymaker' would elinuiniate this suboptinralitv liv simply consistently setting mu = 0, thus conwiucing the putilic that m~should equal zer-o as well. 'I'he public, however, knows that, as sooni as they expect inflation to be zero. the polic maker can in crease svelf ar-c Ito A-/2I by reverting to the discretionary inflation solution. Because the policvnraket' will revert to discretion in this case, the public will rationally expect that inflation will equal A. As a result, the, best solution, ru, = ru~= 0 is unstable, whereas the discr-etiooar-v (Nash I sul utiOni I), = m~A is stable.'' 'I'o this point, the public and the policymaker' wen-e assurued to have the sar-ne information. Suppose, however-, that this is not the case. Backus and Driffill )1985a, 1985b ) consider-a model in which the policynuaker is one of two tvpes;''weak'' or ''stn'ong:' If the pohcymaker is weak, his payoff matrix is the one shown in table 2)1) or 3(t); he, ther'efore, has an incentive to gener-ate inflation), If the policvmaker is str-ong, however, he always pn-efers zer-o inflation.
"it is obtained from the first-order condition for the maximization of (6). 
In the beginning, the public assngns some pt-obahility to the condition that the polnc maker is strong and, therefore, will not inflate. Weak policymakers are tempted to inflate. However', since they maximize welfare niver' sever-al periods, they have an incentive to appear strong, at least initially, to cliscourage inntlationiary expectations. 'I'he public watches the actions of the policymaker and adjusts its proliability accordingly that the policymaker is strong. This proliability is considen-ed to lie a measure of credibility.
As long as the pohcyrnaker does not inflate, the putilic assigns some positive probahiitv to the event that the policyniaker is strong. If the policymaker inflates even one dine, however, he immediately reveals himself to be weak. Because strong policymuaker-s never inflate, there is no way that a policyniaker can reestablish his lost reputation. Consequently, once inflation star'ts, it continues for-ever.
Backus and Driffill formulate this pn(ihlefli as a dynamic, mixed-strategies Bayesian game using Kreps and Wilson's t1982a, 1982b ) notion of sequenitial equilibrium. ' 1 This formulation captunes the incentive of the weak policymaker-to act temporan'ity as if lie were strong in order to ruaintain frntun-e infiationar expectations at a lower level. It also pro'ides the public with a r-ationale fon-watching the actions of the policymaker, at least until it is known that he is weak. This analysis isre stricted, howevei-, by the fact that the po 1 -icymaker can he one of only two unchanging types. "is "The dynamic inconsistency of the first best solution was originally noted by Kydland and Prescott (1977) . "A similar analysis appears in Barro (1985) .
a consequence, once. a reputation is destn-oyed, it cannot be rebuilt. Those features of the analysis ar-c inconsistent with the observed frequent reversals in the n-ate of monetary growth in the United States, England and other democn'acies.
Because equation 2, or' its multi-pet-iod variant, equation 5, is used frequently as a social welfare function in the theor'etical litenature on central bank behavior-, it is important to examine why it takes this specific for-ni." The negative effect of inflation on social welfan-e results from the familiar-loss of consumer surplus that inflation pn-oduces through the decrease in the public's real money balances. The positive association between deviations of employment from its natun'al level and social welfare can be exlilained by the existence of various labor-manket distot-tions (like taxes and unemployment beneflts that make the natural level of employment too low tBarro and Gordon, 1983b). Another explanation, offered by Canzoneni (1985) , is that the presence of large unions keeps real wages too high and the natur-al employment level too low.
'l'he view that the existence of diston-tionary taxes necessarily induces an intla t iooarv bias on the pant cif a socially nnin rded cen) tn-at bank r-aises seven'at (fueslions. Fir-st, this notion relies only on the distor'tionar-v effect of taxes on the allocation of time between labor and leisun-e, neglecting the utility from the putitic good that is finarced by these taxes. Sir)ce irulividuats take the level of the pub tic good I irov ded by gover'omen t as lieing irdepeodent fr-ow their' individual labor-leisure decisions, while the central bank takes into consider'-atioo that tlus level depe rids ni ni total tax collect ionswhich depennI in ttIll I on total em ployruen t ----there is atso an exter-oaliti'. If the socially opti mual level of the pu hue good is higher than the anuounit that can he tioarwed thr-ough the taxes collected in the absence of' ceo tn-at bank iriterven lion, the bank has an incentive to in)cr-ease total tax collections. Whether-tlus implies that it has an iocer)t ive 10 ir) crease eru plovme nit tic decrease it depends on the tax st r-uct u n-c ;no I the cUts I ici lv of labor demand. In the latter-case, the tax distortion and the public good exterr iat itt' have cooflictir)g effects (in) tlie sriciallv op tioia I level of em plot'-nuent in r'elarioo In) its geoen-al equilibr-itrru level in) the absence of centn-al hank intervention. Cukierruan arid "For example, when there is too much of the public good in the nointervention equilibrium, the central bank has a deflationary bias, provided labor demand is sufficiently elastic.
Dr'azeo I 1986) show within a noruioal cool cads fr'amenor-k of the Fischer It977) type that, if the demaod for' labor-is sufficiently inelastic, the last effect domirrates, producing an incentive to decrease emuptovrueut via troao tici pated deflation). Fur-ther-ruor-e, the r-ange of cases iti which the central bank turns out ririt to have an inflationary bias is hy no means negligible.'' 'l'he upshot is that a socially minded polinymuaker facing distoctionar'y labor' taxes should not be autonuaticallv lir'esu med to liossess an inflationary I Has.
Second, if the level of emptoyruent is too low liec,ause of dis tor't ionarv taxes, a full analysis of the behavior' nif policymaker-s should be able to detenuine simultaneously both infiat ion and other taxes, taking into consideration the tax r-ever)ues from inflation. Suet) ar-i extensioni is consider-ed liv Alesina and 'labellini I 19331 wittun a fr'aruewor'k in whict) fiscal and monetary policies are deter'onioed liv two irideperident authorities. An inrpon-tant iruplicatiori of this framuewor-k is that the resulting equilibr-iunu r-ate (if inflation is not necessarily strhioptirual . This will tie discussed more tinIly in) the second iristallmuenit of' this survey.
Finalty, the social welfare firnction inter-pn-etation of the policymaken-'s otijectives does not fit very well with the notion that there are two alternative types of poticyuiakers. One possibility might be ti-nat then'e are two alternative wetfar-e functions that chan-acten-ize the econotuy. If that is the case, however, it seems peculiar that the r-elevant one is known only to the policymaker. Indeed, tius possibility seems untenable. Another-possibility is that, while the objective function of the weak policymaken-is identical to the social welfare function, the strong policymaker-'s objective funiction is diffen-ent ft'otu it. Once it is recognized that the objectives of the policymniaken' muay differ-from the social welfare function, however-, ti-ncr-c is no reason to mestnict the analysis to only a single alter-native for-ruulation. Consider-ation of a van-iety of alternatives is handled by a pohtical intem-pr-etation) of the policymaker's objective function. Recent won-k in both economics and political science suggests that monetary policy is not totally divorced fi-om the genen-al political process. For exam-"In addition to the papers quoted above, those include Barro and Gordon (1983a) , Backus and Driffill (1983b) . Rogoff (1985) and, to some extent, Canzoneri (1985) . 'The centr-al bank knows both the extent of the political pressun-e focused on it to change monetary policy at any given moment and how likely it is to accommodate this pressure. Funthen, the formation of eft'ective coalitions determined to change the cour-se of monetary policy is subject to large stochastic elements. Cukienman'n and Meltzer (1986a) fon'malize this notion with an objective function similar to equation S in which the monetary authority's marginal prefer-"The precise channels through which these responses are elicited are subtle and, at times, etude precise formulation because the President, Congress and the Federal Reserve all have a common interest in preserving an image of the Central Bank as an independent, apolitical institution. Kane (1980 Kane ( , 1982 has argued that the Federal Reserve performs a scapegoat function for the President and Congress. In return, the Fed gets a fair degree of independence which is necessary in order to credibly perform the scapegoat function. A general discussion of the political approach in the context of monetary reform appears in Willet and McArthur (1985) . Weintraub (1978, p.356) concludes after summarizing the history of the post-accord monetary policy that much of this policy "... can be explained just by noting who the President was when the policy under review was in effect," In a study of Presidential influence on monetary policy, Beck (1982) concludes that presidential political demands are somehow transmitted to the Fed. Beck notes that the transmission mechanism requires further study but that it seems clear that presidential preferences are an important determinant of Fed policymaking (Beck, 1982, p. 443) . Woolley (1984) holds a similarview. Hetzel (1985) argues that current institutional arrangements allow Congressmen to pass on political pressures of various constituent groups to the Fed while avoiding association with the consequences that adversely affect the welfare of other groups. This explains Congress' consistent preference (noted by Woolley, 1984 , chapter 7) for attempting to influence monetary policy through a variety of threats to limit the Fed's institutional autonomy rather than through an explicit mandate to guide monetary policy (Hetzel. 1985, p. 7) . Since the autonomy of the Fed depends on Congress, it must be at least somewhat sensitive to the wishes of Congress provided the Fed values autonomy.
Both Congress and the Presidency are institutions largely concerned with various redistributional considerations. As a consequence the Fed is, possibly to a lesser degree, also sensitive to redistributional considerations. In addition, the Fed is not indifferent to the interests of groups with which it deals on a daily basis, e.g., banks and the financial community in general (Woolley, chapter 4) . Arthur Burns (1979) appears to share the view that the Fed is not a totally free agent. He believes that the Fed can work to achieve price stability only if the policy does not adversely affect production and employment and does not irritate Congress. In Burns' words, the role of the Fed is to continue "probing the limits of its freedom to undernourish ...inflation" (Burns 1979, p. 16 ).
ence for' economic stimulation vs. inflation prevention shifts randomly through time. in this fon-mulation, the constant marginal rate of substitution A is replaced by a random variable x, which n'efiects the current compromise that the central bank strikes between advocates of economic stimulation and advocates of price stability."
The crucial element itt this focmulationi is that x, is in a continuous state of flux and is not known by the general public. Howevem-, the pulilic can n-at ionauiy arid gn-adually detect changes iii x, by observing changes in the nate of growth of the nnoney supply; this detection activity provides an explanation for ''Fed watching.'' Since the public is urmwar-e, at any given ruonuent, of the lin-ecise value of the centr-al hank's cur-n-eon x,, the cen tn-al bank is able to affect output through surprise ruoney creation).
"i'hen'ear-e. both similarities and differ-c rices between the social welfan'e and the political in ter-pn'etation of the policyrnaker-'s objective function adopted in) this section.-" The political appn-oach vnews the policymakem' as choosing ruoney growth to maximuize the expected value of~f t[x (rn -m~)-where x, is a stochastic variable with some persistence.
1 ' Equation 7 is fonmaliy equivalent to equation 5 with the sole exception that A is replaced by x; however, its interpretation is quite differ'ent. Equation 7 reflects the curr-ent political compromise between competing objectives preferred by the policymaker; it is not a social welfare function. Similarly, the discount factor f3 reflects the time preference of the policymaker as an "The motivation of either group of advocates may be mostly distributional. Some people are relatively more adversely affected by unemployment than by inflation. Changes in x, reflect changes in (a) the relative sizes of those groups, (b) the degree to which they are adversely affected by inflation and unemployment and, (c) the perceptions of the central bank about those changes and the degree of urgency in accommodating them. In some long-run sense, the central bank may be responding to the desires of voters. However, the public does not know the extent to which the central bank currently responds to voters.
"The following discussion draws heavily on Cukierman and Meltzer (1 986a). "The precise stochastic structure is:
A is a positive, publicly known, constant and p, a first-order Markoff process whose realization is known only to the policymaker. institution with its own priorities rather-than the social rate of discount."
The political interpretation avoids some of the criticisms dir-ected towar-d the social welfare interpretation for the policymaker-'s objective function. Thus, while it is difficult to explain why the nnonetany authority should be better informed about the social welfai-e tinnction than the public, it is easy to believe that the pohicymaker is better infon-med about x,, which simply reflects the policynuaker's curn-ently pr-cferred conupromise tietween conflicting objectives."
The pohicymaken-acts in a discr-etionany manner in planning the n-ate of money gn-owth (and intlation), taking into account the tradeoffs he faces between current stimulation and the public's finture inflationary expectations. In particular, the policymaker knows that cur-rent actions which raise future inflation expectations make it ruore costly un ten-ms of inflation) to ftnrthen stimulate the economy in the thture. The policymaker chooses both the curr-ent money growth arid plans for futune money growth to achieve a maximum for the expected value of the objective function in equation 7.
The decision pattern just descn-ihed is complicated by two additional conditions. First, the policymakem-is assumed to have imperfect control of the money supply -ar:tual money growth deviates r-andonilv fn-onu the gr-owth planned by the mcinetary ar.nthoritv as shoxx'n in) eqitation 3, (SI at, = ml + '1l~, when-c ml is the i-ate of nurinetarv gn-owth planned by the policvmaker for-pen-iod i and 'q, is period i's realization of a white noise process, the variance rif which is defet-nuned by the precision of existing monetary control pr-ocedum-es." "This formulation is consistent with the views of long-time students of the Fed like Lombra and Moran (1980) , Lombra (1984) and Kane (1982) concerning the Federal Reserve System. In particular, Kane (1982, p. 207) writes: "Inherent in the utopian view of the Fed is the presumption than the Fed can somehow evaluate the public interest on its own. In the contemporary United States, it is hard to conceive of the public interest except as a delicate balance of conlticting private interests." "In addition, the political approach does not rely on the notion that distortionarytaxes necessarily induce policies biased toward inflation. "The case in which the level of precision in monetary control is a choice variable is considered later in this paper.
Second, the pohicymakec is assumed to he uncen'tain about his own futun-e objectives. He knows, howeven-, thein cum-n-ent values and uses their per-sistent structun-e (see footnote 21) to derive optimal prechctor-s of future values of x. '1'hese predictions at-c necessany, even though no coruruitment to any pat-ticulan futun-e money growth is n-equin-ed, because he knows that the cun-rent n-ate of monetary griiwth will affect future intlationany expectations. If he expects to care more about employment in the future than he does now, he will increase his ability to create sunpcises at relatively low inflation in future periods liy choosing a n-elatively lowcun-rent monetary gn-owth. lfhe expects to car-c less about employnrient in the fl.ntun-e than lie does at pteserit, he will choose faster-current monetary growth (and faster-intlationi.
The important point is that the policynuaker-must predict his own uncertain objectives in the futun-e when choosing the cur-rent n-ate of money gn-owth. This uncertainty arises because he does not currently know for cen-tair't what the fi.ntum-e optimal (fon himi balance will be between pressures exented by various gn-oups and institutions. The more stable the underlying socio-polntical envit-onnuent, the smaller this tincertainty will he. The uncertainty can he measured liv the variance of the policymaken-'s ohijectives: this is denoted as ot (see footnote 211.
Cukierman and Meltzer I lASfial I CM hen-eaftem-) show that the solution to the pohicvrnaker's decision prob1cm in equati(in 7 is (9i ml = B,, A + BR' where B,, and B an-c positive constants that depend on the parameter-s of the pcilicyniaker-'s objective ti.nnction and the pn-ecision of monetary control, and when-c p, is the n-andom part of x, (see footnote 211. When equation 9 is substituted into equation 8, actual money gn-ou4h can lie expt-essed as 1101 at, = B, A + B~+~-'l'his model assumues that the public does not know the current state of the policvmakers ohjectivesor p is known only by the policyonaket-." The public, howeven', knows the policvniaker's decision rule in equation 10 and has observed at in each pem-iod up to and including the pce~~ous one. Since ru has some degr-ee of persistence. past values of money gr'owth convey noisy, hut niieaningfmnl, infon-matirin about fintune money gn-owth to the pulilic. The noise is induced tiy the contn-ol et-n-on, 'q" Since A is public information, knowledge of x, is equivalent to knowledge of p,.
The optinual predictor of future money growth adjusts slowly to actual changes in observed money growth; specifically, (Ill m~= (p--k) m,_, -I-Xrn;t, + II --p1 B,,A."
The liat-ameter A is detenmined by the degn-ee of persistence inn the policynuaker's objectives, the precision of monetary control and the degree of instability in the political envu-onrnent of the policymakem-as measun-ed by o-~. Because A is hounded between 0 and p, the value of p -A is positive.
Equation 11 specifies that expected money growth is a weighted avenage of last period's money gr-owth, m,_,, the last pen-iod's expectation, nii'.., and B, A." inflationary expectations partially adjust to changes in actual and planned ruoney gr-owth hiecause, as implied by equation 10, actual money growth is influenced both by persistent changes in the objectives of the policymakem-and by tn-ansitomy control em-ron-s. The pirblic, then-efore, rationally attributes only part of the fluctuations in at to persistent changes in the objectives of the policymaker.
When choosing the rate of money gn-owth, the poticyniaker takes into consideration its effect on future inflation expectations tequation 111.11) fact, the policymaker's decision rule (equation 9( is the solution to maximization of the expected value of his olijective function (equation 71, given how the public's intiation expectations an-c formed (equation ill.
The equilibrium fornued from these equations is self-fulfilling. Given the decision n-ule of the policymaker (equation 91 and the money growth equation (equation 10), the best pnedictor of future inflation is given by equation 11. Convem-sel , given this pn-edicton-, the best str-ate~'for the policwuaker is shown hi equation 9, which induces the money growth shown by equation 10.
The self-fulfilling natw-e of eqinililirium does not mean that tbiere an-c no tuonetanv surpn-ises. in fact, monetamy surprises (ic:cinn fn-equently: their-expected value, however-, is zeto. 'the reason for' fi-equent muonetanv surpn-ises is that the objectives of the policymaker "In statistical terms m~is the expected value of m, conditioned on m,..,, m,,,.., are continually changing; the pr.rblic, howevem, becomes awan-e of those changes oni~y gr-adualiy hiy observing past rates of inflation. Thus, when the policyrnaker becomes relatively less concen-ned about inflation prevention the puhihic recognizes this j.iolicy change only gn-adually. tn the inten-inu, actual inflation is liighet than expected and employruent is above its natun-al level. Conversely, when the pohicymaker becomes relatively nion-e concerned about inflation pn-eventioni, inflation is lowen-that) expected and output is below its natun-al level until the putilic r-ecogmiizes this policy change.
'The public monitors changes in nuonetany growth becan.nse these figures provide additional inforruation about ftntui-e inflation. This incentive to monitor money growth explains why n-esources are devoted to Fed watching (Bull, 1982; Han-douvelis, 19841 . in the absence of asymmetric information, them-c would be no neason for this activity.
Recently Fisclien 1984) has stressed the importance of the speed with which the pulilic's expectations adjust for-deten'mining the costs of disinflation policy actions. The fasten-expectations adjust, the lower the output costs of disinflation will lie. CM show thai the speed with which expectations ad just is systematically nelated to the precision of monetary conttol. in particular, the less precise rnonetany contm-ol is, the larger is A in equation 11 and the longen it takes for-the public to recognize that the policvmaker's objectives have chauged." CM conceive of cn-ediliility as the speed with which the putihc recognizes that a change in the policymaker's otijectives has actually occur-I-ed. 'this concept of credibility seems appn-optiate when policy is discretionary and the po)icvmuaker's objectives (known only to hirin) an-c mi constant flux. 'l'he parameter A from equation 11 is a natinm'al and convenient measun-e of credibility." Using this measint-e, ct-edibility is highen-, the more precise monetary control is Ithe lower the vaniance of ii.
It has been (ibsenved that shor-t-rn.nn considen-ations (ilten are given relatively tat-ge weight iii the actual conduct of ruonietamv policy. In ten-ms of the frame-"With a higher K, less weight is given to the last observed inflation, m,,, and more weight is given to the last inflation expectation, mn.,, "As shown in equation (I Gb) of CM, K is a known function of r) and p as well so that credibility is also influenced by the instability of objectives and their persistence. work pr-esented here, this observation means that the policynuaker has a lugh time preference (j3 in equation 7 is low). CM show that the higher-the policvmaker"s time preference, ceter'is pan-ibtis, the higher the vaniability and the uncen-tainty in the n-ate of nionetany growth.
'l'he chan-acter'ization of credibility differ's somewhat among vanious models of monetary policy behavior. As explained above, in the CM formulation, cn'edibility is a par-aineten-. It measures the speed with which the public detects the actual changes in the policymaker's objectives. CM charactenize credibility under-discretion and asyrumetnic infon-mation. tn nuodels with two types of policyuiakens, credibility or' reputation is a state variable.'' It is the curm-ent subjective probability assigned by the pulihic to the event that the policymaker-is strong.
Barno and Gordon (1983b), on the other hand, focus on the ctedibhty of the finst-best, non-inflation&y policy and] point out that this policy is "incredible" under-discretion and symmetric information.
The Crethbillti' r)f'fl hlk'f') . innm.ineed Mane lore Tnri•~ets
Cinkierman and Meitzen (1986b1 extend the politically based model to the case in which the policymaker makes noisy (e.g.,~'1Iini()~nIi(:em(~r~ts of tar-get ranges r-athet-than a specific levell but unbiased announcennents about his future plans." In this case, the public finds it optimal to use the information fronu past announcenuents in addition to past monetary growth to fornu its expectations. In comparnsori to tbe case in which no announcements anin made, noisy announcements never men-ease (and usually decrease) the public's inncen-tainty about futur-e monetary gr-owth. In the case in which announcements are muade, cr-edibility is naturally defined as the deviation between the cun-ent announcement and the pulilic's expectation. This deviation depends on the relative amotrnts of noise in both the control of the niiminey supply and the announcements, as well as (in the magnitude of recent changes in the policymaker"s objectives. Various students of central bank hehavion-have suggested that the low credibility and ambiguity in the specification of objectives by ceutral banks may be, to some extent, deliberate." The political approach presented in the previous section provides an explanation for' this inclination fun' policy ambiguity. Consider the case in which the level of noise in monetary control is a choice variabte nather than a technological datum. The policymaker will choose, once and for all, the variance of the monetary control err-or that manmizes the unconditional expected value of his objective function, which, for this discussion) is equation 7."
For any given level of control precision. the planned and actual money growth are determined by equations 9 and 10, respectively, and the public's inflationary expectations are determined by equation 11. By choosing more noisy control procedures, the pohcymaker increases A in equation 11; this, in turn, increases the length of tinie it takes the public to recognize a change in the policymakem-'s objectives.
Whether a longer recognition peniod is desin-able, howeven, depends upon the change in pohcymakerobjectives. It is advantageous when the pohc maker becomes relatively more concer-ned about econonuic stimulation; in this case, lie can produce positive surprises for a longer-time period. When the policymaker becomes relatively more concerned about inflation, however, a highen-A is detrimental; it lengthens the peniod of recession arid negative surprises niecessany to decrease inflation. Thus, the policyruakemwould like to have lower-credibility (in the CM sense) ilBackus and Driffill (1985a, 1985b); Barro (1985) . "In recent hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Lombra argues that the observed incompleteness in the specification of quantitative goals for monetary policy is deliberate (Lombra. 1984 p. 113) , Similar views are expressed in Brunner and Meltzer (1964) and Lombra and Moran (1960) , The penchant of the Central Bank for secrecy has recently been revealed in the legal record of a case in which the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was sued under the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, The suit required the FOMC to make public immediately after each FOMC meeting the policy directives and minutes for that meeting (Goodfriend, 1986) , The Federal Reserve argued the case for secrecy on a number of different grounds. The important issue from the point of view of this section is that the Federal Reserve attempted to preserve its information advantage. "The following discussion is based on section VI of Cukierman and Meter (1986a) .
when he becomes more interested in stimulating employment and higher credibility when he becomes more interested in preventing inflation."
Although positive and negative surprises cancel each other-out on average, the policymaker may still find it advantageous to choose control procedures that slow down public recognition of changes in his objectives. Greater ambiguity provides the policymaker with greater control in timing monetary surprises. When there is more ambiguity about policy, he can create larger positive surprises when he cares more about stimulation and leave the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he is relatively more concerned about inflation.
Thus the policymaker makes a once-and-for-all 1po-litically) optimal choice of control procedures that also determines his public credibility. This choice is systematically related to the degree of time preference of the policymaker; in particular, policyrnakers with a stronger time preference will choose less precise control procedures .M oreover, the higher the degree of uncertainty in the policymaker's objectives, the more likely he is to choose less precise control procedures and lower credibility. When the policymaker's objectives are relatively unstable, a rational public will give more weight to recent developments in forecasting the future rate of growth of money. Consequently, for a given precision in monetary control, it is more difficult to exploit the benefits of monetary surprises. By decreasing the precision of monetary control, a policymaker with relatively unstable objectives can partially offset this effect by increasing the length of time it takes the public to detect a given shift in its objectives.
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•W~'Ẽ ver since Kydland and Prescott 11977) pointed out that the monetary authority and the public are caught "This may explain why public concern about lack of credibility is aroused mostly when disinflation is considered. Not much concern was expressed at the end of the '60s and the '70s complaining about the lack of credibility of the increased inflationary policies of those times. "Long-time students of the Fed like Brunner and Meltzer (1964) , Kane (1977 Kane ( , 1980 , Mayer (1982) and Pierce (1980) suggest that the Federal Reserve engages primarily in "fire fighting." In terms of the model, this would imply a high rate of time preference (low~3 in equation 7). In conjunction with the result obtained by CM, this implies that the Fed is likely to have a preference for incomplete control procedures and imperfect credibility.
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in a prisoners' dilemma resulting in excessive inflation, it has become natural to look for mechanisms that would eliminate or reduce this inefficient result. Obviously, a first-best solution would be to effectively commit the policyniaker to a zero inflation policy." If such commitments are impossible, second-best solutions may be sought.
One second-best solution that relies on deterrence within a symmetric information environment has been suggested in Barro and Gordon (1933a) . It can be illustrated using the relationships previously described. 'The basic idea is that the public must determine its inflation expectation in a way that deters the policymaker from choosing its optifnal discretionary rate of inflation, for example, A in equation 6. Suppose that the policymaker announces a rate of inflation, m*, that is lower than A. The public then sets its inflationary expectation for the current period as follows: If actual inflation in the previous period accords with expectations, they expect that inflation will continue at m. If the previous period's inflation does not accord with expectations, they expect instead that the monetary authority will inflate at the higher discretionary rate, A. Thus, whenever the monetary authority inflates at rate A rather than at its announced rate m, the public "punishes" it for one period by believing that it will continue to do so in the next period as well."
The monetary authority maximizes its objective function (equation 5) subject to the public's behavior.' 9
In considering whether to inflate at rate A today, it compares the difference between the current value of social welfare when it inflates at rate A rather than at rate m (given that the public expects ml with the discounted value of the loss in next period's welfare because the public's inflation expectations increase from m* to A." As long as the latter term lwhich acts as a deterr'ent) is larger than the former term (which "Or to whatever the optimal rate of inflation happens to be. "In spite of its popularity, this term does not quite catch the function of this strategy. The idea is not to punish the monetary authority but rather to deter it from inflating at the discretionary rate A. This observation is due to Edward Green. "The example here is within the social welfare framework in which the policymaker's objectives are identical to the social welfare function.
"The calculation of this loss is based on the understanding that fhe monetary authority chooses A also in the next period. The reason is that this choice yields a better value to ifs obiective function than the choice m'. Given that, in the next period, expectations are at A, inflation alA yields -A'!2 to the policymaker whereas inflating atm' yields A(m' -A) -(m*) 2 !2 which is smaller for any m' <A.
repr'esents the temptation to inflate at rate A), the policyinaker picks m', the lower inflation rate.
Formally (from equation 5), the condition for effective deterrence of the higher inflation A is
The left-I-rand terni is the discounted value of the loss in next period's welfare due to the increase in expectations. The right-hand term is the gain in current welfare induced by higher' current employment.''
The lowest credibly sustainable rate of inflation can he found by equating the two sides of equation 12 and solving for-~~l'lie solution is shown in equatioti 13:
This rate is higherthan the first-best zero inflation, but lower-than ti-re t-ate of intlation, A, that would occur' in the absence of deterrence. Equation 13 expresses the best enforceable r-ule as a function of the ci iscount factor' i3~The higher the degr'ee of tiriie pr-eference, the higher the minimum sustainable rate of inflation will be.'' Once this mechanism is in place~it is selffulfilling: H-re public believes that the pohicymaker will inflate at rate m* and, indeed, the pohicvriiaker-cloes so. in the absence of commitments, ther'efor'e, a secondbest lower rate of inflation can he credibly sustained by an appropriate deterrence mechanism.
f.r',t,:n'vm cif the .IJef.erre.rtce ,4,'mreDiehhj-'i'he deterrence approach to enhancirig central bank credibility has been inter'pr-eted by some leg., Barro and Gordon, 1983a1 as a positive theory of inflation." Taylor 119831, however, m-aises doubts about its usefulness as a positive theory of inflation on the grounds 'Note that the ideal inflation expectation, m' -= 0, cannot be sustained if there is positive time preference, it would require the inequality 22 to hold; however, this condition cannot be satisfied when [3 < 1, A somewhat higher rate of inflation can be sustained by this mechanisnievenforli< I. "Since this isa quadratic equation there are two roots, the smailesf of which corresponds to the minimum credibly sustainable inflation, "Obviously other deterrenoe mechanisms will yield different sustainable ranges for the rate of inflation, "It also can be considered from a normative point of view, in which it represents a mechanism that improves welfare in comparison to a situation in which this mechanism is absent, that, in other-similar' dynamic inconsistency situations, society has found ways to circumvent the prob-)em. He cites patents as a device for eliminating the dynamic inconsistency problenrs faced by inventors as an example.
In addition, the deterTence equilibrium implies that the rate of inflation remains constant (Canzoneri, 1985) . This irnphcation is clearly at odds with observations that both inflation and monetary growth fluctuate substantially over' tirrre. Further-, the deterrence equilibrium depends critically on the punishment strate~'assumed in the analysis. Consequently, the infinite-horizon monetary policy game has multiple Nash equilibria with no mechanism for choosing among them (Backus and Driffill, 1985a) . Therefore, any specific link between the current actions of the pohicyrrraker and the future expectations of the pubhc is strictly arhitraiy.
Finally the deterrence strate~' may he suhject to a fi'ee rider problem." Individuals may simply find that it is not worthwhile to achieve a lower' rate of inflation via the deter-rence mechanism if the private costs of monitoring the po)icymaker's actions ar-c higher than the marginal private benefits. This problem, whiie of lesser importance in the context of oligopoly theory from which the fbrrnal strrtctur-e of the deterrence equilibrium above has originated, may he serious if ti-re public is composed of many individuals." Each individual may rely on the others to deter the pohcymaker from acting in a discretionary manner, thus elirninating the deterr'ence mechanism that made the lower inflation policy cr'edible in the fir'st place.
GtYtfThfJTJh,NG WD%j/V)::flC
Traditional economic analysis gerier-ally has treated policyniakers' behavior as determined exogenoushv. In contr-ast, recent hI erature on central hank behavior focuses explicitly on how the motives, constraints and information of policvmakers and the public rleter'mine nionetar-v policy outcomes.
Some anahysls use a political explanation of the pnlicyniaker's objectives; othier's identi.h' the poicyniaket-'s objectives with a social welfare function. Both au~im-oachesshow how an itiflat ionat-v bias is cm'cated by interactions between the polic~jri m.kei-and ti-re "Suggested by Edward Green in conversation, '0, Friedman (1g71, 1g77) contains an early discussion of the deterrence strategy in the context of oligopoly.
public. Models utilizing the political approach, however', seem to be better' able to explain two widely observed phenomena: the preference of monetary authorities for ambiguity in public policy pronouncements amid the Iar'ge swings in actual rates of money gr-owth and inflation. Unl'ortuniately~existing political models have not identified explicitly how various groups arid political institutions combine to shape the objectives of the monetary authority."
More recently, models have appeared that combine explicitly sonic interaction between political hehaviom-, institutions, and economic policymaking. Some of these models n'ely on the existence of long-term comitm'acts to induce a tradeoffbetween lower inflation arid stimulation. A central theme of this litet-ature is the optimal design of mnonetamy institutions. 'those developments will be described in the second pam't of this survey.
